Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

The Gemara analyzes the braita brought to support Rav Sheshet’s position that the fetus of a sanctified animal that became blemished can be redeemed (i.e., designated before the mother is redeemed to be used for the same sacrifice as its mother). First, the Gemara explains what can be derived from the concluding line in each section of the braita, “this is the general rule” (klalo shel davar). Then, an inference from the braita is used to raise a difficulty against Rav Huna’s position that offspring of sanctified animals that became blemished cannot be fixed, but must be left to die. However, the Gemara suggests that Rav Huna could read the braita without making that inference.

Two versions are presented regarding one who slaughters a blemished sanctified animal outside the Temple courtyard (azara): in one version, the person is exempt; in the other, obligated. The second position is explained as referring to a blemish in the cornea (dukin she-be’ayin) according to the position of Rabbi Akiva.

Regarding the law of a substitution (temura) for a disqualified sanctified animal: Rav Nachman rules that if it was substituted after the original animal was redeemed, the substitute animal must be left to die, as there is no solution for it (similar to Rav Huna’s position above regarding the fetus). Rav Amram disagrees, deriving from the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe that such animals can be eaten/slaughtered after becoming blemished. However, Abaye explains why those cases are not comparable. A braita is then brought to support Rav Nachman’s position.

The Mishna rules that if an Israelite receives livestock from a non-Jew under a guaranteed livestock arrangement (tzon barzel) where the Jew accepts responsibility for the livestock, agrees to return its value as assessed at the time of the arrangement, and splits the proceeds, the offspring are exempt from firstborn status (bekhora). However, the third generation will be obligated in bekhora, meaning the fourth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen.

If the Israelite substitutes the offspring in place of the mothers to secure the principal, the third-generation offspring are exempt, but the fourth generation offspring are obligated meaning the fifth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even up to ten generations are exempt, as the non-Jew can always collect from the animals.

If a ewe gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat gives birth to a sheep-like species, the offspring is exempt from bekhorah, unless it exhibits some physical characteristics (miktzat simanin) of its mother, in which case it is obligated.

The Gemara questions whether tzon barzel remains in the domain of the non-Jewish owner, raising a contradiction from the laws of interest (ribbit), which prohibit an Israelite from accepting tzon barzel from another Israelite because it is considered to be in the recipient’s domain and is therefore considered interest. Abaye distinguishes between cases based on whether the giver accepts responsibility for unavoidable loss and market depreciation. Rava rejects this distinction and explains that for bekhora, the exemption applies because if the Israelite fails to pay, the non-Jew can seize the animals or their offspring. Thus, “the hand of the non-Jew is in the middle” (yad goy ba’emtza), which invalidates the requirement of bekhora.

The Gemara analyzes the dispute regarding the generations of offspring when offspring are substituted for their mothers under a tzon barzel arrangement: Rav Huna holds that the second generation is exempt while the third generation is obligated, whereas Rav Yehuda holds that third generation offspring are also exempt and only fourth generation offspring are obligated.

The Gemara discusses a contradiction regarding the time for redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor). One braita states that is can be done immediately, while another states that it cannot be performed before thirty days. Three resolutions are brought. Rav Nachman explains that if one redeemed it within thirty days, it is redeemed post-facto (b’dieved). Rav Sheshet suggests that the thirty-day timeframe teaches that one does not violate the prohibition against delaying the mitzva during this period. Rava resolves the conflicting opinions and explains that the dispute depends on whether one follows Rabbi Eliezer, who compares a firstborn donkey to a firstborn son, or the rabbis, who do not.

The Mishna rules that if the owner does not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he decapitates it from behind and buries it. The commandment of redemption takes precedence. The Mishna lists additional mitzvot that have an order of precedence: the commandment of designation (ye’ida) takes precedence over the commandment of redemption for a Hebrew maidservant; the commandment of Levirate marriage (yibbum) originally took precedence over chalitza, but nowadays the commandment of chalitza takes precedence because people do not intend it for the sake of the mitzvah; and the commandment of redemption by the owner takes precedence over any other person in redeeming sanctified non-kosher animals.

At the opening of the second chapter, the Mishna rules that if an Israelite buys, sells, enters a partnership in, or receives on a sharecropping contract (kibalat) a fetus or an animal of a Gentile, the offspring is exempt from firstborn status of kosher animals, as it is stated in the Torah “in Israel,” excluding animals under joint or full ownership of Gentiles. Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of a kosher animal, as their exemption applies only to pidyon haben and peter chamor.

The Gemara asks why the masechet begins with laws of fistborn donkey and then of kosher animals given that kosher animals possess intrinsic sanctity (kedushat haguf) while a donkey possesses only monetary sanctity (kedushat damim). The Gemara answers that matters regarding non-kosher animals are few, and therefore the matter was concluded first, or because a firstborn donkey is cherished.

Regarding transactions with a Gentile, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nachmani said in the name of Resh Lakish, who quoted the words of Rabbi Oshaya, that an Israelite who gave money to a Gentile (and a Gentile who gave money to an Israelite) acquires through money alone, and does not require physical pulling (meshikha). This derives this from the verse “from the hand of your neighbor” (mi-yad amitekha), teaching that meshikha is required only between an Israelite and his neighbor, whereas a transaction with a Gentile is effected through money.

Ameimar holds a dissenting opinion – that a transaction between a Gentile and an Israelite is effected through money. The Gemara analyzes how to understand the verse of amitekha according to Ameimar according to the positions of both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish.

A difficulty is raised from a braita against the position of Rabbi Oshaya regarding one who buys pieces of silver (gruta’ot) from Gentiles and finds an idol inside, where ownership depends on whether money was given or physical pulling (meshikha) was performed. The Gemara resolves the difficulty through four different explanations.