Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another’s property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item.

The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew’s wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate.

The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar’it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one’s house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye’s explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava’s explanation.

The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated – such as an olah, asham talui, or todah – renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What is the status of an animal slaughtered to items connected to the ground, like mountains, seas, rivers or deserts? The Mishna rules that the shechita is invalid, but the assumption from the Mishna is that it is not prohibited for benefit. The Gemara challenges this from a braita which states that such slaughter renders the animal an idolatrous sacrifice (zivchei meitim), which is forbidden for benefit. Abaye resolves this by distinguishing between slaughtering to the item itself – which only disqualifies the shechita – and slaughtering to the angel or deity of the landmark (gadda), which renders it forbidden from any benefit.

Can a person render someone else’s property forbidden by performing an act of idolatry with it? Rav Huna rules that if a friend’s animal is lying before an idol and someone slaughters one siman for the idol, the animal becomes forbidden. He relies on the principle of Ulla that while merely bowing to another’s animal does not forbid it, performing a physical action (ma’aseh) directly on the animal does forbid it.

A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna from a braita regarding one who slaughters a sin offering on Shabbat outside the Temple courtyard for an idol, who is held liable for three distinct sin offerings. If the animal becomes forbidden at the first siman, as per Rav Huna’s position, the completion of the slaughter should not trigger the liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, as it would merely be slaughtering a disqualified animal that would no longer be considered a sacrifice. The Gemara offers two resolutions – applying the case to a bird sin offering where the slaughterer specifies that his intent for idol worship will only take effect upon the completion of the slaughter, or in the shechita of a bird sin offering where half the windpipe was already slit, and in this case the shechita was completed in one small action.

Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak disagree with Rav Huna and reaffirm the established principle that a person cannot forbid something that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo) even by performing an action on the item. A difficulty is raised against this position from the braita quoted above with the interpretation given above.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile’s intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile’s default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person’s intent affects another person’s act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside.

What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l’shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi’s position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan’s position.

What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis’ and Rabbi Eliezer’s positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to.

Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile’s intent does not disqualify the Jew’s shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted.

Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer’s view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.