Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

The Gemara continues to analyze the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda regarding the offspring generations of guaranteed livestock (tzon barzel) that one received from a non-Jew. It evaluates their views against the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Mishna and against the statement of the tanna kamma in the first clause (reisha) of the Mishna, demonstrating how each Amora reinterprets the words of both Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the tanna kamma.

Regarding a ewe that gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat that gives birth to a sheep-like species (nidmeh), a braita brought by Rav Oshaya from Nehardea records that Rabbi Meir obligates the offspring while the Sages exempt it. The Gemara clarifies the subject of their dispute. After rejecting the possibilities that it concerns firstborn status (bekhorah), first shearings (reishit hagez), or slaughtering a mother and child on the same day (oto veet beno), the Gemara returns to state that it indeed concerns firstborn status, but under special circumstances—presenting three options to explain the specific case in which they disagree and the precise point of dispute.

Rabbi Yochanan notes that Rabbi Meir agrees that the Rosh Chodesh goat offering (se’ir shel rosh chodesh) must come from a female goat born to a goat and not from a hybrid offspring (nidmeh). An objection is raised against him: no sacrifice may come from a nidmeh, as derived from an explicit exposition! To resolve this, the Gemara explains that both verse derivations are necessary.

The Gemara discusses the status of wool that came from a nidmeh (such as a ewe born to a goat). Such wool is exempt from the prohibition of mixed species (kilayim/ shaatnez), invalid for tekhelet threads in tzitzit, and immune to garment leprosy (nega’im), as derived by an analogy to flax (pishtan), which cannot have a nidmeh counterpart. Similarly, Rav Ashi rules that wine from a vine draped over a fig tree is invalid for altar libations (nesakhim).

The Mishna addresses a ewe that gives birth to two male lambs whose heads emerge simultaneously. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds both go to the kohen based on the plural verse “the males belong to Hashem”, whereas the Sages hold exact simultaneity is impossible (i efshar letzamtzem), so one belongs to the owner and one to the kohen. Rabbi Tarfon lets the kohen choose the better lamb, while Rabbi Akiva rules that the kohen receives the leaner one, with the second lamb grazing until it contracts a blemish; it remains liable for priestly gifts (matanot), whereas Rabbi Yosi exempts it. If one lamb dies, Rabbi Akiva rules that the burden of proof rests on the claimant (hamotzi mechavero alav hare’aya) and the animal remains with the owner.

In analyzing the principle of simultaneity/exactness (tzimtzum), the school of Rav Yannai asks whether human precision (beyedei adam) is possible according to the Sages, even if exact simultaneity at birth is impossible. They bring four examples—the red line on the Altar (chut hasikra), the dimensions of Sanctuary vessels, impurity in equal halves of a broken earthenware vessel, and a corpse found equidistant between two cities—to reach a conclusion, but each possibility is rejected.

The Gemara analyzes the braita brought to support Rav Sheshet’s position that the fetus of a sanctified animal that became blemished can be redeemed (i.e., designated before the mother is redeemed to be used for the same sacrifice as its mother). First, the Gemara explains what can be derived from the concluding line in each section of the braita, “this is the general rule” (klalo shel davar). Then, an inference from the braita is used to raise a difficulty against Rav Huna’s position that offspring of sanctified animals that became blemished cannot be fixed, but must be left to die. However, the Gemara suggests that Rav Huna could read the braita without making that inference.

Two versions are presented regarding one who slaughters a blemished sanctified animal outside the Temple courtyard (azara): in one version, the person is exempt; in the other, obligated. The second position is explained as referring to a blemish in the cornea (dukin she-be’ayin) according to the position of Rabbi Akiva.

Regarding the law of a substitution (temura) for a disqualified sanctified animal: Rav Nachman rules that if it was substituted after the original animal was redeemed, the substitute animal must be left to die, as there is no solution for it (similar to Rav Huna’s position above regarding the fetus). Rav Amram disagrees, deriving from the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe that such animals can be eaten/slaughtered after becoming blemished. However, Abaye explains why those cases are not comparable. A braita is then brought to support Rav Nachman’s position.

The Mishna rules that if an Israelite receives livestock from a non-Jew under a guaranteed livestock arrangement (tzon barzel) where the Jew accepts responsibility for the livestock, agrees to return its value as assessed at the time of the arrangement, and splits the proceeds, the offspring are exempt from firstborn status (bekhora). However, the third generation will be obligated in bekhora, meaning the fourth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen.

If the Israelite substitutes the offspring in place of the mothers to secure the principal, the third-generation offspring are exempt, but the fourth generation offspring are obligated meaning the fifth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even up to ten generations are exempt, as the non-Jew can always collect from the animals.

If a ewe gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat gives birth to a sheep-like species, the offspring is exempt from bekhorah, unless it exhibits some physical characteristics (miktzat simanin) of its mother, in which case it is obligated.

The Gemara questions whether tzon barzel remains in the domain of the non-Jewish owner, raising a contradiction from the laws of interest (ribbit), which prohibit an Israelite from accepting tzon barzel from another Israelite because it is considered to be in the recipient’s domain and is therefore considered interest. Abaye distinguishes between cases based on whether the giver accepts responsibility for unavoidable loss and market depreciation. Rava rejects this distinction and explains that for bekhora, the exemption applies because if the Israelite fails to pay, the non-Jew can seize the animals or their offspring. Thus, “the hand of the non-Jew is in the middle” (yad goy ba’emtza), which invalidates the requirement of bekhora.

The Gemara analyzes the dispute regarding the generations of offspring when offspring are substituted for their mothers under a tzon barzel arrangement: Rav Huna holds that the second generation is exempt while the third generation is obligated, whereas Rav Yehuda holds that third generation offspring are also exempt and only fourth generation offspring are obligated.