Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

This is the daf for Shabbat. 

The Mishna rules that all are permitted to slaughter animals, and if they do, the meat is kosher. While establishing this broad permission, the Mishna excludes minors, deaf-mutes (cheresh), and the mentally incompetent (shoteh). However, if an adult supervises them to ensure the slaughter was performed correctly, the meat is valid.

The Gemara questions the Mishna’s phrasing: the opening phrase “all may slaughter” implies an ab initio (l’chatchila) permission, yet the concluding phrase “their slaughtering is kosher” suggests the act is only valid post facto (b’dieved). Initially, Rav Acha attempts to prove from other Mishnayot that the term “all” can indeed refer to a post facto case, neutralizing the question. Conversely, Rav Ashi cites other Mishnayot to show that “all” is a term typically used for ab initio rulings.

While both ultimately concede that “all” can technically carry both meanings, Rav Ashi argues that the context here implies ab initio. To resolve the Gemara’s original difficulty, Rava bar Ulla explains that each phrase in the Mishna refers to a different specific case, and he proceeds to re-interpret each line accordingly. However, three difficulties are subsequently raised against Rava bar Ulla’s interpretation, all of which the Gemara eventually resolves.

Rav Huna differentiates between those living in exile in Babylonia and those living in other places regarding their nature.

Rav Chisda (or Rav) is quoted as making a statement differentiating between gentiles who live in different places in the world, specifically in reference to whether or not they recognize God and the place of the Jewish people. However, after raising a difficulty, this statement is emended.

A number of Sages extrapolate different verses to highlight the importance of Torah study by comparing it to sacrifices. One view explains that God treats those who study Torah as if they have physically offered sacrifices in the Temple. Another view goes further, suggesting that one who studies Torah has no need for sacrifices at all, effectively idealizing Torah study as a superior form of divine service.

The Mishna compares one who sacrifices animals to one who sacrifices birds and to one who sacrifices mincha offerings, stressing that all sacrifices are equal before God—those of the wealthy and those of the poor—as the most important element in sacrifices is the intent.

Sacrifices are offered to God and are not intended for God’s benefit, but for the person bringing the sacrifice, which further highlights the importance of the person’s intention rather than the outward action.

• For more information about What is a Siyum, click here
• For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here.

A third challenge is brought against the ruling of Raba bar Avuha, which posits that one who vows to bring “an ox from my oxen” must provide his best ox. The difficulty arises from a comparison to commercial law: if a person sells “a house among my houses,” they are not legally obligated to provide the buyer with their finest property. This discrepancy is resolved by distinguishing between the laws of hekdesh (consecration to the Temple), where the Sanctuary maintains the “upper hand,” and the laws of sales, where the seller retains the “upper hand.”

If an individual vows to bring an offering to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, the fulfillment of that vow depends on its specific phrasing. Generally, if the vow was intended for a Temple for God, the offering must be brought to the Temple in Jerusalem; however, if the vow was specific to the Temple of Onias, there is a dispute as to whether the offering is considered a sacrifice and would be punished by karet or if the person has merely committed a “meaningless” act.

A kohen who served at the Temple of Onias and subsequently repents is barred from performing service in the Temple in Jerusalem. This was a penalty to such priests, categorizing them as equivalent to a blemished kohen; while they are disqualified from performing the sacrificial service, they are still permitted to eat and share in the distribution of the sacrificial foods (kodashim) with their fellow priests.

Likewise, a kohen who served in idolatrous worship is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet debate four specific scenarios to determine if they constitute “serving” an idol and whether a priest who performed them can return to Temple service. These four cases are: slaughtering an animal to an idol intentionally, sprinkling the blood unwittingly, bowing down to the idol, and accepting the idol as a god by verbal declaration.

A fundamental debate exists between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the nature of the Temple of Onias itself – specifically, whether it was established for worship of God or for idolatry. Each Sage cites a different historical tradition regarding the political and family disputes that led Onias to flee to Egypt and build his Temple.

Six containers were used in the Temple for collecting voluntary offerings, for which six different explanations are provided to clarify their specific purposes.

If a person vows to bring a specific animal for a voluntary offering and it becomes blemished, the animal must be redeemed and replaced. The Rabbis permit using the redemption money to purchase a different type, size, or number of animals, whereas Rebbi requires the replacement to match the original animal’s type, size, and number exactly.

When a person vows to bring “one of my oxen,” the best and the middle-quality oxen are sanctified because the specific intent remains unclear. Raba bar Ulla distinguishes this from the phrase “an ox from my oxen,” explaining that such language clearly indicates the best ox was intended. The Gemara challenges this distinction by citing laws from house sales, where the definitions of intended property follow different standards.

The Mishna lists various vows, such as “I vow to bring gold to the Temple” or “I vow to bring wine,” and specifies the exact quantities required to fulfill each obligation. The Gemara then analyzes and clarifies the Mishna’s rulings for every case mentioned.

A debate exists between Rebbi and the Sages regarding the minimum amount of oil required for a vow—specifically, whether it is one log or three. The scholars who preceded Rav Papa suggested that the root of this dispute lies in their hermeneutical methods: whether to derive both a general principle and its details from a single external source, or to derive the principle from one source while drawing the details from the case itself. Rav Papa proposed an alternative theory but ultimately conceded after Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, cited a braita that definitively refuted his explanation.

Regarding the minimum value for one who vows to bring a specific animal to the Temple, the law stipulates that different species require different minimum expenditures to fulfill the obligation.