Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

This is the daf for Shabbat.

The Mishna lists different elements of the mincha and other offerings that are essential. The Gemara delves into the derivations for each of these. Some elements are repeated Torah, and this repetition serves as an indicator that the act must be performed in that specific way. Others are deemed essential due to a specific formulation in the verse – a word that indicates a particular detail is necessary.

The Gemara delves into two specific issues related to items on the list. One involves the four species of the lulav. A statement of Rav Chanan bar Rava is brought—that the essential element of the four species is that they be present, but they do not all need to be taken at once. A difficulty is raised against him from a braita that makes clear that the species need to be bound together. This is resolved by explaining that there are two different Tannaitic positions on this, based on whether or not the species are required to be bound.

The second issue is the sprinkling of the blood of the Red Heifer, which must be performed while facing the Sanctuary. There are two contradictory braitot: one holds that if the blood is not sprinkled while facing the Sanctuary, it is disqualified, while another holds that it is not. Two resolutions are brought – either each source reflects a different Tannaitic position, or each is addressing a different situation.

The tzitz (headplate of the Kohen Gadol) effects atonement only for the disqualification of impurity (tum’ah) and not for other disqualifications such as yotzei (sacrificial meat taken outside its boundaries), piggul (improper intent), notar (remnants left past the legal time), or ba’al mum (a blemished animal). Both in the braita and in the discussions of the amoraim, these laws are derived from the biblical verses – establishing that the tzitz atones specifically for impurity and not for other types of disqualifications.

The Gemara highlights a contradiction between two braitot: one states that the tzitz atones for an individual’s offering only if it occurred inadvertently (shogeg), while the other states that the tzitz atones whether it occurred inadvertently or intentionally (mezid). The Gemara offers four potential solutions to resolve this contradiction, the first of which is rejected.

A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren’t touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word “tzeiruf” used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them.

Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching.

Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well?

If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren’t comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye’s point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well.

Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish’s position, but it is resolved.

Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each.

The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages – either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder.

Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda’s position of min b’mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.