Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav’s position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this.

Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda’s view on hachana – the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat – citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda’s prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one’s dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira.

The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda’s position regarding eruv techumim.

Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda’s position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered “food” even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits.

The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel’s understanding of Rabbi Yehuda’s view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel’s interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda’s position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav’s own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept.

Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi’us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor’s intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor’s thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor’s action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely – such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor’s action is significant when the minor’s intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor’s actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action.

Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek).

The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita.

The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices.

The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.

Rav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter.

Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: If an agent is appointed to slaughter an animal or separate teruma (tithes), and the owner subsequently finds the meat slaughtered or the produce tithed, can we assume the agent performed the task and the food is permitted? Rav Nachman distinguished between the two: the meat is permitted, but the produce is not. He explained that we cannot automatically assume the agent performed the task, and must consider that a third party might have intervened. Regarding shechita, this is acceptable because of the presumption that most slaughterers are experts. However, regarding teruma, if a third party separates tithes without the owner’s permission, the act is legally ineffective.

The Gemara suggests that the question of whether we presume most slaughterers are experts is a Tannaitic dispute, but this suggestion is ultimately rejected.

Although a deaf-mute, a minor, or a mentally incompetent person may slaughter under supervision, the Gemara infers from the Mishna’s phrasing that one should not grant them an animal to slaughter ab initio. Furthermore, the fact that their slaughter is valid and the meat is permitted indicates that slaughtering does not require intent (kavana), a position attributed to Rabbi Natan.

The Gemara asks for the source of the principle that we follow the statistical majority (rubba), such as in cases of yibum involving minors where we assume the male is not a saris (sterile) and the female is not an aylonit (barren). The Gemara proposes ten different Torah laws as potential sources for this rule.

While difficulties are raised against each possibility and some are resolved, the Gemara ultimately rejects them all. It suggests that these sources might only prove that we follow the majority when it is impossible to clarify the actual status; however, in a case where it is possible to determine the reality, one may be required to investigate rather than rely on the majority.