Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma’asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale.

Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman’s understanding of the Mishna in Ma’asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine.

A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases.

The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na’ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana.

A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na’ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na’ara.

A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

The braita continues with the analysis of the unique laws governing earthenware vessels. Through a series of suggested logical kal v’chomer arguments, they demonstrate how scriptural verses restrict the ways these vessels contract and protect against ritual impurity, each in their own unique manner. Specifically, the verses dictate that an earthenware vessel can only contract impurity through its interior airspace (me’aviro) and never from its outer surface (miggabbo). Conversely, other types of vessels cannot contract impurity from their airspace but do contract it from their outer surface.

The Mishna sets forth an additional rule of contrasting halakhic status: a state that renders a wooden vessel ritually pure leaves a metal vessel impure, and vice versa. A braita clarifies that unfinished wooden vessels are susceptible to impurity while flat wooden vessels are pure. For metal, the law is reversed: unfinished metal vessels are pure while flat metal vessels are susceptible to impurity. The braita explains what is defined as an unfinished vessel in this context.

The Gemara presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Nachman regarding the underlying reason for the distinction between unfinished wood vessels and unfinished metal vessels – whether it is because these vessels are made for honor, or because they are expensive and therefore their crafting is not considered complete as long as any detail is missing. There is a practical ramification between these two opinions regarding vessels made of bone. The scriptural source establishing that bone vessels can contract ritual impurity is subsequently derived.

The Mishna introduces contrasting rules regarding the tithing obligations of bitter and sweet almonds. A braita explains that bitter almonds are subject to tithing only when they are young and small, since they are unfit for consumption when they are mature and large, whereas sweet almonds are subject to tithing only when they are large. Rabbi Yishmael b’Rabbi Yosi quotes an opinion that either both stages are completely exempt or both are completely obligated. The Gemara explains the opinion that both are obligated by explaining that mature bitter almonds can be sweetened by roasting them over a fire.

The Mishna outlines the changing legal status of grape-seed water (temed). Prior to fermentation, it does not possess the status of wine and cannot be purchased using second tithe funds, yet it disqualifies a mikveh if three logs of it fall inside a mikveh that does not have the requisite amount of water (forty se’ah). Once it ferments, its status changes to wine, meaning it can be purchased with second tithe funds and no longer disqualifies a mikveh. The Mishna also introduces a contrasting rule regarding brothers who are partners in an estate or partners after already dividing their estate, balancing their obligations toward the Temple half-shekel surcharge (kalbon) against their obligations toward the cattle tithe.

The Gemara analyzes which tanna this Mishna follows regarding the status of temed, since on the surface, it does not appear to align with any opinion appearing in the Mishna in Masechet Maasrot (Chapter 5, Mishna 6).

The Mishna states that the method of slaughtering a red heifer (para aduma) is not the same method used for breaking the back of the neck of a decapitated heifer (egla arufa), and vice-versa. A braita brings a source demonstrating that one cannot break the back of the neck of the para aduma and that one cannot slaughter the egla arufa. Both laws are derived from verses found within the passage of the egla arufa.

The Mishna notes that while blemished kohanim are disqualified from Temple service, blemished Levites are fit for their respective duties. Conversely, while Levites are restricted to a specific age range for their service, kohanim can work in the Temple at all ages. A braita derives a source for both of these exclusive rules from a verse in Bamidbar 8:24. The age limitation on Levites only concerned the period of carrying the Tabernacle in the desert; for the singing service, there is no age limitation, provided the Levite can still sing properly.

Regarding this age restriction for the Levites, a contradiction arises between two verses, as one states the youngest age one can work is thirty, while another states twenty-five. The Gemara reconciles this by differentiating the stages: at twenty-five a Levite begins his training, and at thirty he can actually perform the service.

A braita brings a debate about the minimum age for kohanim to begin serving in the Temple – either at the biological age of maturity (the appearance of two pubic hairs) or at the age of twenty. The maximum age for their service is when they reach old age, which Rabbi Ela in the name of Rabbi Chanina defines as the point when one begins to tremble.

Rav Chisda explains the scriptural source behind this minimum age debate. Later, the Gemara brings two explanations regarding whether Rebbi’s requirement of twenty as the minimum age is an enacted rabbinic law, or if it was instituted because the older kohanim felt uncomfortable with teenagers performing the sacred Temple service.

The method of contracting ritual impurity in earthenware vessels is not the same method of contracting impurity in other vessels. A braita details the exact differences and delineates the scriptural sources from which they are derived.